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A Genetic Algorithm for the Multi-Source and Multi-Sink
Minimum Vertex Cut Problem and Its Applications
M. Tang and C. J. Fidge
Abstract—We present a new penalty-based genetic algorithm
for the multi-source and multi-sink minimum vertex cut problem,
and illustrate the algorithm’s usefulness with two real-world
applications. It is proved in this paper that the genetic algo-
rithm always produces a feasible solution by exploiting some
domain-specific knowledge. The genetic algorithm has been
implemented on the example applications and evaluated to show
how well it scales as the problem size increases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Minimum cut problems can be categorized into minimum
edge cut and minimum vertex cut problems. Minimum edge
cut problems involve finding the minimum edge set that
will make a given graph disconnected if the edges in the
set are removed. Minimum vertex cut problems involve
finding the minimum vertex cut set that will make a graph
disconnected if the vertices in the set are removed. Both
minimum edge cuts and minimum vertex cuts have many
applications, especially for determining maximum possible
throughput in a network.
Although minimum cut problems have been studied for
decades, and many variations of the minimum cut problems,
such as the single-source and single-sink (s,t)-cut problem
for a weighted graph, have been identified, the problem of
finding the minimum vertex cut between multiple sources
and multiple sinks has received little attention. However,
the multi-source and multi-sink minimum cut problem has
many real-world applications, two of which we present in
Section IV.
The only existing implementation of a multi-source and
multi-sink minimum vertex cut algorithm we are familiar
with is the deterministic one used in the Secure Information
Flow Analyzer [11]. SIFA is an open-source software tool
for analysing potential information flow through electronic
circuitry. Among its various features it includes a multi-
source and multi-sink cut function that begins by creating
a subgraph comprising all paths that link selected ‘source’
and ‘sink’ vertices. It then enumerates all combinations
of vertices in these paths, up to a given maximum size,
and for each such combination checks whether its removal
would disconnect the sources from the sinks and returns the
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number of vertices in the combination if so. The particular
combination of vertices that disconnects the sources and
the sinks and has the smallest cardinality is the optimum
solution.
This kind of combinatorial algorithm works well for small
limits on the maximum size of the cut. However, as the
problem size increases the worst-case complexity of such
algorithms grows exponentially. (The best single-source and
single-sink minimum cut algorithms typically have quadratic
efficiency [1, §14.2.4].)
In this paper we present a penalty-based genetic algorithm
for the multi-source and multi-sink minimum vertex cut
problem. The genetic algorithm is a population-based global
search, inspired by natural selection and genetics [6]. It can
always produce a feasible solution and its computation time
does not increase dramatically as the problem size increases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
The multi-source and multi-sink minimum cut problem is
characterised in Section II before our penalty-based genetic
algorithm is discussed in detail in Section III. In Section IV
we tackle two real-world applications using our penalty-
based genetic algorithm. Then, we present our evaluation
results on the genetic algorithm in Section V, before sum-
marising our conclusions in Section VI.
II. THE MULTI-SOURCE AND MULTI-SINK MINIMUM
VERTEX CUT PROBLEM
Given a weighted directed graph G = (V,E,W ),
where V = {v1, v2, · · · , vn} is the set of vertices, E =
{e1, e2, · · · , em} is the set of directed edges, w : V → R+
is a function from vertices to weights, S ⊂ V is a non-empty
source set, and T ⊂ V is a non-empty sink set, the multi-
source and multi-sink minimum vertex cut problem is to find
a subset of vertices C ⊂ V such that
• the sources and the sinks will be disconnected if the
vertices in C are removed from G;
• C
⋂
S = ∅;
• C
⋂
T = ∅; and
•
∑
v∈C w(v) is minimal.
Fig. 1 illustrates the multi-source and multi-sink minimum
vertex cut problem. In this instance, S = {v1, v2}, T =
{v8, v9, v10}, the minimum vertex cut C = {v3, v7}, and the
total weight of the cut is 7.
Whereas a single-source and single-sink cut is traditionally
called a (s,t)-cut [2], we denote multi-source and multi-sink
cuts as ‘(S,T)-cuts’, the capitals indicating source and sink
vertex sets, rather than individual source and sink vertices.
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Fig. 1. A graph with minimum weighted vertex cut {v3, v7}
III. A GENETIC ALGORITHM FOR THE MULTI-SOURCE
AND MULTI-SINK VERTEX CUT PROBLEM
In this section we present a penalty-based genetic algo-
rithm for the minimal (S,T)-cut problem from Section II.
A. Encoding and Decoding
Given a directed graph G = (V,E,W ), a source vertex
set S, and a sink vertex set T , a solution to the weighted
minimal (S,T)-cut problem can be represented as a binary
string of |V | − |S| − |T | bits X = x1x2 · · ·xn, where n =
|V |−|S|−|T |. Each variable xi in X corresponds to a vertex
in V −S−T . Let vi be the corresponding vertex of xi. Then,
xi is defined by Equation 1,
xi =
{
0, if vi ∈ V − S − T ;
1, otherwise. (1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For example, for the weighted minimal (S,T)-cut problem
shown in Fig. 1, the encoding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Under the encoding scheme, cut {v3, v4}, for example, is
encoded 00111.
V3 V4 V5 V6 V7
X1 X3X2 X5X4
Fig. 2. Encoding scheme for a cut of the graph in Fig. 1
Decoding is done by looking-up the mapping between the
binary bits and the vertices. For example, individual 01110
is decoded into {v3, v7}.
B. Genetic Operators Used
1) Crossover: The only crossover operator used in this ge-
netic algorithm is a classical one-point crossover operator [6].
It combines segments from two parent chromosomes to
produce only one offspring. Let the length of chromosomes
be n. If P1 = x11x12 · · ·x1n and P2 = x21x22 · · ·x2n are
two parent chromosomes, then the offspring chromosome
is O = x11x1n · · ·x1kx2(k+1)x2(k+2) · · ·x2n, where k is a
randomly generated crossover point. For example, if P1 =
01111, P2 = 10111, and k = 3, then O = 00111.
2) Mutation: Given a chromosome X = x1x2 · · ·xn, the
mutation operator randomly selects a gene and then changes
the allele value of the gene to its complement. Let the
kth gene be selected. The mutated chromosome is X =
x1x2 · · ·xk−1xkxk+1 · · ·xn. For example, if X = 01001 and
k = 3, then after mutation X = 01101.
C. Fitness Function
Each individual in the population is a potential solution to
the weighted minimal (S,T)-cut problem, but an individual
generated by the crossover and mutation operators may not
be a feasible solution, that is, the corresponding vertex set
does not disconnect the nodes in S from the nodes in T .
However, an infeasible individual may still contain some
useful building blocks that are essential to build the optimal
solution. Thus, it is unaffordable to lose it, particularly in
the early stage of the evolution of the genetic algorithm
when the building blocks have not been passed to any
offspring. Thus, the strategy that we adopt in the genetic
algorithm is to keep infeasible individuals in the population.
However, it should be guaranteed that the fitness value of
any infeasible individuals will be less than that of any
feasible individuals; otherwise, the genetic algorithm may
not converge towards an optimal solution. In addition, it
should be reflected in the fitness function that the smaller
the weight of the corresponding cut of an individual, the
fitter the individual is. Equation 2 is a fitness function that
meets the above requirements.
F (X) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0.5 + 0.5×
(
1− W (X)W∗
)
, if P (X) = 0;
0.5− 0.5×
(
W (X)
2W∗ +
P (X)
2P
)
, otherwise.
(2)
In Equation 2, W (X) is the weight of the corresponding
cut of X , which can be calculated by Equation 3, and W ∗ is
the weight of the maximal cut, which is given by Equation 4.
W (X) =
n∑
i=1
(1− xi)× w(i) (3)
W ∗ =
n∑
i=1
w(i) (4)
Also in Equation 2, P (X) stands for the accumulated
reachability from S to T after removal of all the vertices
in the corresponding set of X from G, and P = |S| × |T | is
the upper bound of P (X). It is reachable from vertex s to
vertex t if there exists a path from s to t. Let
reachable(s, t) =
{
1, if there exists a path from s to t
0, otherwise.
(5)
Then the accumulated reachability from S to T is defined
by Equation 6.
Accumulated(S, T ) =
∑
∀<s,t>∈S×T
reachable(s, t) (6)
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Algorithm 1 Calculation of accumulated connectivity
Require: a directed graph G = (V,E,W ), a vertex set U ,
a source node set S and a sink node set T .
Ensure: return the accumulated connectivity between S and
T in G after moving all the vertices in U from G.
for each vertex u ∈ U do
remove u from G;
end for
for each vertex v ∈ S do
assign a unique token to v;
add v to queue Q1;
visited[v] = false;
end for
visited count = 0;
for i = 1 to (|V | − 1) do
while Q1 = ∅ do
remove an element from Q1 and put it into w;
visited[w] = true;
visisted count = visited count + 1;
for each vertex x that is adjacent to w and
visited[x] = false do
pass all the tokens that w has received to x;
add x to queue Q2;
end for
end while
if visited count = (|V | − 1) then
exit;
end if
end for
total paths = 0;
for each node v ∈ T do
count total number of different tokens that v has re-
ceived and save it to takens;
total paths = total paths + tokens;
end for
output total paths.
This value can be calculated using Algorithm 1. The basic
idea behind the algorithm is to use a breadth-first search to
traverse the vertices in the graph G, starting from those nodes
in source set S. Before the breadth-first traversal, each of the
nodes in S is assigned a unique token. When a node is visited
it receives all the tokens of its predecessors. The traversal
terminates when all the nodes in the graph have been visited.
Then the algorithm counts the total number of unique tokens
that each of the nodes in T has received. The sum of the total
unique token numbers that all of the nodes in T hold gives
the accumulated reachability. The computational complexity
of the algorithm is O(n2) in the worst case, where n is the
number of vertices in graph G.
Equation 2 guarantees that the fitness value of any feasible
solution is greater than 0.5 while the fitness value of any
infeasible solution is less than 0.5. Thus, we can be sure
that the fitness value of any feasible solution is greater than
that of any infeasible solution. It is also guaranteed that when
P (X) = 0, or when the individual X is feasible, the smaller
its corresponding cut size C(X), the fitter the individual, and
that when P (X) = 0, or when the individual is infeasible,
the smaller its corresponding cut size C(X) and the less the
accumulated connectivity P (X), the fitter the individual.
Property 1: ∀X , 0 ≤ F (X) ≤ 1.
Proof: According to the definitions, 1 ≤ C(X) ≤ n
and P (X) ≤ P . When C(X) = 1, F (X) has the maximal
value, which is 1, and when C(X) = n and P (X) = P ,
F (X) has the minimal value, which is 0.
Property 2: F (X) > 0.5 if and only if X is a feasible
individual.
Proof: If X is a feasible individual, then P (X) = 0,
where P (X) is the accumulated connectivity between the
source vertex set S and the sink vertex set T when the cut
is X . According to the fitness function defined in Equation 1,
F (X) = 0.5 + 0.5/C(X) > 0.5.
If F (X) > 0.5, then, according to the fitness function
defined in Equation 1, P (X) = 0, which indicates that X is
feasible.
D. Genetic Algorithm Description
Having defined our fitness function and the algorithm
for checking connectivity, our genetic algortithm for finding
weighted minimum multi-source and multi-sink cuts is now
presented as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Penalty-based genetic algorithm for the
weighted minimal (S,T)-cut problem
Require: a weighted directed graph G, a source node set S
and a sink node set T .
Ensure: a feasible minimal weighted (S,T)-cut Cut.
create an initial population of PopSize individuals,
Population;
initialize best solution best = 00 · · · 0;
best fitness = F (best);
while termination condition is not true do
for ∀X∈ Population do
calculate its fitness value F (X);
end for
select individuals from Population using the roulette
selection strategy and pair them up;
for each pair of the selected individuals do
probabilistically use the crossover operator to produce
a child, child;
probabilistically use the mutation operator to mutate
child;
replace a parent with the child;
if F (child) > best fitness then
best = child;
best fitness = F (child);
end if
end for
end while
transform best into a cut set Cut;
output Cut.
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Theorem 1: Algorithm 2 always produces a feasible solu-
tion.
Proof: In Algorithm 2, best is initialized as 00 · · · 0,
which represents a vertex set that includes all the vertices
in G except for those vertices in S and T . So, it is a
feasible vertex cut as removal of all the vertices and the
edges adjacent to the vertices will remove all the nodes
and edges between S and T . During the evolution, best
is replaced only when a fitter individual is produced. Since
best is a feasible individual, its fitness value best fitness is
greater than 0.5 according to the fitness function defined in
Equation 2. So, whenever an old best is replaced, the fitness
value of the new best must be greater than 0.5. According
to Property 2, if the fitness value of an individual is greater
than 0.5, then the individual must be a feasible individual.
Thus, its corresponding vertex cut is a feasible vertex cut.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In this section we present two different practical applica-
tions of our weighted minimum (S,T)-cut algorithm.
A. Information Security Evaluation of Electronic Circuitry
Domain separation devices are used to keep classified and
unclassified data apart in security-critical communications
networks, such as government or military LANs connected
to the Internet. Examples of such devices are data diodes
(which enforce unidirectional information flow), encryption
devices (which allow classified data to be sent over insecure
connections), keyboard-video-mouse switches (which allow
a single workstation to access both high-security and low-
security computers), and trusted filters (which constrict in-
formation flow).
Before such devices may be used to connect a high-
security communications ‘domain’ to a low-security one,
they must be evaluated rigorously, as specified in standards
like the Common Criteria for Information Technology Secu-
rity Evaluation [4]. The evaluation process includes tracing
potential information flow pathways through the device’s
electronic circuitry and embedded software, to confirm that
only unclassified data reaches the low-security domain.
For complex devices, such evaluations are notoriously
labour-intensive, time-consuming and costly. It has been
noted elsewhere [10] that considerable effort may be saved
by focusing the evaluation on a cut comprised of subcircuits
that connect the device’s high-security inputs to its low-
security outputs. If the security evaluator can show that only
unclassified data flows through the cut then the evaluation is
complete.
However, we note here that a simple cut does not consider
the evaluation complexity of the subcircuits it contains. In
practice some circuits consist exclusively of logic gates
and other simple, stateless electronic components that are
easy to evaluate with respect to potential information flow
through them. Circuits incorporating components that may
store data, such as flip flops and memory chips, are harder to
evaluate, because data entering them in one operating mode
may be released in another. Worst of all, circuits containing
microprocessor chips require information flow through the
embedded software running on the processor to be evaluated,
using static analysis techniques entirely different from those
applicable to hardware. Therefore, the choice of cut for
security evaluation of electronic devices needs to be weighted
by the effort involved in assessing information flow through
each cut element.
As an example, consider the block diagram in Fig. 3 for
a demonstration ‘trusted filter’, developed as an unclassified
testbed for security evaluation techniques [3]. (For brevity we
have omitted the device’s ‘shutdown’ circuitry, which allows
it to enter a safe mode if a fault is detected.) Such filters
are typically used to restrict the range of commands sent to
other security-critical devices, e.g., to prevent an encryption
device from being remotely switched to ‘plaintext’ mode.
Eight-character commands enter the device from a high-
security network, via the RS232 Receiver on the left, and
exit the device to a low-security network, via the RS232
Driver on the right. The Data Input Processor performs
character-wise serial-to-parallel conversion and buffers the
incoming characters until they are needed. It also performs
a number of syntactic validity checks on the commands
received. On the opposite side, the Data Output Processor
performs parallel-to-serial conversion of outgoing characters,
and releases commands to the low-security network only
when the whole command has been checked.
In between, the Control Signal Generator orchestrates
character-by-character comparison of incoming commands
with those that are allowed to pass through the device,
and generates the release signal for valid commands. The
Dictionary circuit includes an EPROM memory chip con-
taining a list of all legitimate commands. The Comparator
circuit compares corresponding characters in each command
received from the high-security input with those in the dictio-
nary, and indicates to the Control Signal Generator whether
or not a match has been found. For flexibility, commands
in the dictionary may contain wildcard characters which
match any ASCII character. The ASCII Code Generator
circuit sequentially produces ASCII character codes that are
substituted for wildcards by the Multiplexer circuit, so that
all possible matching commands are sent to the Comaprator.
Finally, the Clocking circuit is a simple oscillator used to help
synchronise the Dictionary circuit with other independently-
clocked components in the device.
However, on its own, the block diagram doesn’t tell us
how much effort is involved in evaluating information flow
through each subcircuit. Therefore, we have decorated each
circuit in the diagram with a weight (in square brackets)
indicating its estimated ‘evaluation complexity’. For circuits
consisting of simple electronic components, such as logic
gates, counters, and edge triggers, this weight is simply the
number of components in the circuit.
This is the case for all circuits except for the Data Input
and Output Processors. These two components are both Pro-
grammable Integrated Circuit (PIC) microprocessors, whose
information transmission characteristics depend on the C
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Fig. 3. Functional block diagram for a security-critical communications device
programs running on them. Accordingly, we have given both
of these components a large weight (1000) since we want
to avoid the need to closely analyse the software if at all
possible.
Finally, to represent a circuit diagram as a directed graph,
we need to introduce trivial vertices to model forking tracks
on the printed circuit board, i.e., vertices A, B and C in
Fig. 3. Such vertices have no ability to block the flow of
classified data, and hence no significance for information
security evaluations, so we don’t want to select them as part
of our security evaluation cut. Therefore, we have given them
an infinite weight, so that they will not be chosen by the cut
algorithm.
Notice that when only the ‘data’ paths in Fig. 3 are con-
sidered the high-security receiver on the left is disconnected
from the low-security driver on the right. In this way, the
device’s design aims to ensure that only commands in the
dictionary (or generated from it via wildcards) can be sent
to the low-security domain.
However, a thorough information security evaluation will
also consider the possibility that high-security data is trans-
ferred via control signal pathways, so we also need to
evaluate the connectivity implied by the whole graph. When
both data and control signal pathways are considered, it is
not immediately obvious where is the most efficient place
to begin the evaluation, so we can use our weighted cut
algorithm to make this decision.
To see whether classified data originating from the high-
security domain can be sent through the device, we assume
that the RS232 Receiver is the source set and the RSR232
Driver is the sink. Applying our weighted cut algorithm to
the block diagram then identifies the singleton set containing
the Control Signal Generator circuit as the cut. To complete
the security evaluation we thus need to be certain that no
classified data is communicated by this circuit.
Fortunately, inspection of this circuit’s schematic diagram
reveals that it comprises a straightforward collection of
logic gates that perform two tasks. Firstly, it synchronises
comparison of individual characters from the Data Input
Processor, the Dictionary and the ASCII Code Generator
circuits. The signals that control this process feed back into
the trusted filter itself, rather than going to the low-security
output, so they present no security concerns. Secondly, it
sends the ‘release’ signal to the Data Output Processor that
permits a (copy of a) command received from the high-
security input to be sent to the low-security output if and
only if it has been found to fully match a command in, or
generated from, the dictionary. Since the only consequence of
this action is that a command expected by, or known to, the
low-security domain is transmitted, we can conclude that this
action is safe as well. Overall, therefore, we can assert that
the trusted filter’s design is secure, even without performing
a thorough evaluation of its other circuits.
As a further example, information security evaluations
sometimes consider data sources within the device of interest.
This is usually done for devices that create classified data,
such as passwords or encryption keys, but it may also
be done to ensure that a security-critical device does not
reveal anything about its internal construction. In the case of
our trusted filter both the Dictionary and the ASCII Code
Generator components could be treated as classified data
sources.
Applying our algorithm to a source set consisting of
the RS232 Receiver, Dictionary and ASCII Code Generator
circuits, causes it to produce a new cut containing both
the Control Signal Generator and the Multiplexer. Again
the algorithm successfully avoids the difficult-to-evaluate
circuits in favour of simpler ones. The Multiplexer circuit
merely consists of two four-bit multiplexer chips which allow
characters from the dictionary to pass through unchanged,
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Fig. 4. Distribution network for a perishable food product
except wildcards, which are replaced with generated ASCII
characters. The net result is that the only commands produced
by this circuit, that may potentially reach the low-security
domain, are (wildcard-instantiated) commands which the
trusted filter is known to let pass. No other commands either
from the high-security domain or the internal components
can reach the Data Output Processor.
(However, a broader, functional argument is needed to
confirm that the order of entries in the dictionary, or the order
in which character codes are generated, are not revealed to
the low-security domain. This property is a consequence of
the way the Comparator, Control Signal Generator and Data
Output Processor circuits work together to ensure that the
commands sent to the low-security domain are only those
that are both received from the high-security domain and can
be generated from the dictionary, irrespective of the sequence
in which commands are compared.)
B. Tracking Items in an Autonomous Distribution Network
Conducting safety-critical product recalls is a major issue
for the food industry [5]. Perishable goods must be delivered
quickly, so potential contamination may not be detected until
a shipment is already en route. Distribution centres often
operate autonomously, forwarding goods based on stock
levels reported by retailers, so tracing a particular shipment
can be difficult even when it is still in the major supply
chain. (Even worse, once goods leave the retail network they
are impossible to track and recalls must rely on haphazard
measures such as making media announcements.)
Our weighted cut algorithm can be used in this situation to
help optimise the recall process. Consider a scenario where
laboratory testing reveals that a recently-dispatched shipment
of eggs is suspected of being contaminated with salmonella.
Commercial product recall software can help find the invoice
associated with the suspect batch, and identify when and in
which direction it was sent [12], but cannot help trace the
batch once it enters the autonomous distribution network.
Fig. 4 shows the main road routes of the assumed dis-
tribution network, in this case covering the Australian state
of Queensland. The suspect shipment was addressed to the
“North Queensland” distribution region and left the city of
Brisbane by road 6 hours ago. Assuming a best-case speed
through the densely-populated south-east corner of the state
of around 60 km/hr, we expect that the shipment has travelled
at most 360 kilometres, which means that at best it could be
en route between the towns of Bundaberg and Gladstone. (We
can be more precise by considering handling times at each
distribution node encountered, and delays due to overnight
and weekend stops [8], but this simple approximation is
sufficient for our purposes here.)
The challenge now is to identify an optimal strategy for
intercepting the suspect batch before it reaches its final
destination. We assume that this requires an inspector to
manually scan each shipment’s barcode, or the installation
of a RFID tag reader, to identify the shipment in question as
it passes through a distribution centre. We also assume that
each distribution centre (town) may have several receiving
docks and several dispatching docks, each of which must be
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TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON THE SCALABILITY OF THE GENETIC ALGORITHM
Test Case Problem Size Solution Computation Time (ms)
|V | |E| Min Max Ave StDev Min Max Ave StDev
1 10 30 1.24 14.28 4.89 3.09 31 140 57.7 24.70
2 20 60 10.40 100.33 48.46 23.86 46 203 100.13 38.87
3 30 90 19.90 174.48 78.25 35.40 78 281 148.53 54.71
4 40 120 63.22 229.11 131.61 51.21 109 375 199.1 68.39
5 50 150 97.93 395.28 180.33 75.14 156 671 298.5 120.68
6 60 180 132.52 472.08 210.22 70.60 203 765 405.23 150.58
7 70 210 156.00 873.81 303.80 171.76 281 1203 627.17 259.58
8 80 240 214.17 627.54 330.85 102.48 359 1640 656.87 302.89
9 90 270 236.26 515.69 347.03 49.57 437 1859 659.47 298.31
10 100 300 333.52 1302.22 439.04 226.80 515 2156 904.67 388.69
monitored. In Fig. 4 the number of each is indicated in square
brackets. Distribution centres in the more densely-populated
south-east of the state are larger and have more docks than
those in the sparsely-populated north and west of the state.
Given this information we can apply our (S,T)-cut algo-
rithm to the problem of finding the most efficient way of
intercepting the batch of suspect eggs. We assume the set
of source nodes consists of Brisbane, Toowoomba, Roma,
Maryborough and Bundaberg. (Strictly speaking we could
eliminate Toowoomba and Roma from consideration, since
it is not expected that a shipment addressed to “North
Queensland” would be sent in that direction, but we leave
them in the source set to illustrate the fact that our algorithm
can cope with such dead-end paths.) We further assume that
the set of sink nodes comprises all the towns in the North
Queensland distribution region, which is here assumed to
consist of Cairns, Townsville, Charters Towers, Hughenden
and Mount Isa.
To associate a weight with each distribution node, we
then let the fitness function be the minimum of the number
of receiving docks versus the number of dispatching docks
in each town. This allows us to minimise the number of
inspectors required, by stationing them at either all of the
receiving docks or all of the dispatching docks, whichever is
fewer.
Applying our algorithm to this problem then produced
a cut consisting of (the receiving dock at) Bowen and
(either the receiving or dispatching dock at) Winton. This
solution allows us to intercept the suspect batch with only
two inspectors, whereas the “obvious” cuts of Gladstone or
Rockhampton would require at least four. (The towns of
Bowen and Longreach are an equally-good solution.)
V. EVALUATION
Our genetic algorithm was implemented in the C# pro-
gramming language and evaluated. The evaluation was fo-
cused on the correctness of the outcomes and the scalability
of the genetic algorithm. This section presents the evaluation
design and results.
A. Evaluation Environment
The evaluation was conducted on a Pentium 4 desktop
computer with a 3.00GHz CPU and a 0.99GB RAM. The
operating system was Microsoft Windows XP.
B. Parameters of the Genetic Algorithm
The maximum population size was set at 100. The prob-
ability for crossover and the probability for mutation were
0.95 and 0.05, respectively. The termination condition of the
genetic algorithm was “no improvement in the best individual
in 10 consecutive generations”.
C. Correctness Evaluation
In order to evaluate the correctness of our genetic algo-
rithm, we transformed the two applications discussed in Sec-
tion IV into two multi-source and multi-sink weighted vertex
minimum cut problems, and used the implemented genetic
algorithm to find the optimal solution for the problems. We
compared the solutions generated by the genetic algorithm
with the optimal solutions that we worked out manually to
see if they coincided. In this way, we can know if the genetic
algorithm can find the optimal solution for these two real-
world problems.
The solutions found by the genetic algorithm for
tracking items in the autonomous distribution network
problem from Section IV-B were {Bowen,Winton} and
{Bowen,Longreach}, both of which are optimal solutions to
the problem. (Because of the stochastic nature of the genetic
algorithm, it may produce different results in different runs.)
The solution found by the genetic algorithm for the
information security evaluation of electronic circuitry prob-
lem from Section IV-A, using the RS232 Receiver as the
only source and the RS232 Driver as the only sink, was
{Control Signal Generator}, while the solution for the prob-
lem using the RS232 Receiver, Dictionary, and ASCII Code
Generator as the sources and the RS232 Driver as the
sink was {Control Signal Generator,Multiplexer}, both as
we expected.
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Fig. 5. Scalability analysis
D. Scalability Evaluation
In order to test the scalability of the genetic algorithm,
we randomly generated a set of directed graphs of different
sizes. The number of vertices ranged from 10 to 100 with an
increment of 10, and the numbers of edges was three times
the number of the vertices. The sources were the first one-
fifth of the vertices and the sinks were the last one-fifth of
the vertices.
For each of the configurations, we randomly generated
30 instances of directed graphs and used the implemented
genetic algorithm to find a solution to each of the instances.
Table I gives the characteristics of the randomly generated
test problems and the statistics of the test results. The test
results include the minimal, maximal, and average weights
of the minimum vertex cuts found by the implemented
genetic algorithm, and the minimal, maximal, and average
computation time spent on finding the minimum vertex cut
for each of the configurations. The computation times spent
on finding the minimum vertex cut set for different sizes
of the test problems are visualized in Fig. 5. It can been
seen from Fig. 5 that the computation time of the genetic
algorithm appeared to grow linearly with the number of
vertices for the range of problem sizes tested.
It should be pointed out that the complexity of the problem
should be measured by not only the number of vertices, but
by the number of edges as well. However, since in the tests
the number of edges was always three times the number
of vertices, we did not show the number of edges in the
figure. In addition, it should be mentioned that the standard
deviation was large. This is likely due to the fact that the
complexity for solving graphs with the same number of
vertices can be different—some topologies are easier to solve
than others, even if the graphs have the same ‘size’.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a new penalty-based genetic al-
gorithm for the multi-source and multi-sink minimum vertex
cut problem. Two practical applications of the algorithm were
also presented, one for information security evaluation of
electronic devices and one for tracing items in autonomous
distribution networks. The proposed genetic algorithm has
been implemented and evaluated. The usefulness of the
algorithm has been demonstrated by applying it to two real-
world applications in the case studies and the scalability of
the algorithm was demonstrated empirically in the evalua-
tion. The genetic algorithm can always produce a feasible
solution for the multi-source and multi-sink weighted vertex
minimum cut problem for given applications.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to use
a genetic algorithm to tackle the multi-source and multi-sink
weighted vertex minimum cut problem. This outcome may
have many potential applications beyond the two examples
discussed in this paper.
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